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Henderson: The Lawlessness of Aggregative Torts

THE LAWLESSNESS OF AGGREGATIVE TORTS
James A. Henderson, Jr.*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Aggregative torts rely on nontraditional theories of liability in
which collective, rather than individual, interests are paramount. All
legal rules are to some extent aggregative in that they purport to treat all
similarly situated persons alike. But traditionally, in most instances
involving allegedly tortious conduct, individual rights are deemed to be
invaded and the claim for recovery is personal to the individual victim.1
Some legal actors such as partnerships and corporations embody formal
aggregations of interests even though they are treated as singular entities
for tort liability purposes. And modem systems of civil procedure allow
for the procedural aggregation of individual claims via class actions and
other forms of consolidation. But while class actions sacrifice individual
autonomy in collective claiming processes to achieve consistent
outcomes and economies of scale, the underlying claims remain
individual in nature.2 Indeed, the elements of most traditional torts are
sufficiently unique to individual claimants that they preclude the
commonality required for class certification.3
By contrast, aggregative torts involve substantive, as well as
procedural, aggregation; collectivity is built into the elements of the
torts, themselves. Large, informally defined groups of persons are
alleged to be the collective victims of the defendant's wrongdoing, and
the defendant's conduct is wrongful in part because it adversely affects
large numbers of persons. The injuries for which the victim group seeks
*

Frank B. Ingersoll Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.

1. See generally PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 5-6 (5th ed. 1984).
2. See, e.g., Henry Schein, Inc. v. Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d 675, 693-94 (Tex. 2002) ("The
procedural device of a class action eliminates the necessity of adducing the same evidence over and
over again in a multitude of individual actions; it does not lessen the quality of evidence required in
an individual action....").
3. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 622-25 (1997).
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recovery are typically pure economic losses not necessarily flowing out
of tangible harms. And when aggregative tort claims result in recoveries,
typically the spokespersons retain the proceeds either for their own
benefit, to reimburse them for previous expenditures on the group's
behalf, or for the benefit of the group, as such. Invariably, the plaintiffs'
lawyers are among the major beneficiaries of successful aggregative tort
recoveries. A paradigmatic, albeit hypothetical, example of such a claim
might involve allegations that otherwise lawful industries have unjustly
enriched themselves over the years by adversely affecting the health and
welfare of the residents of upstate New York. The spokespersons for
such a broadly defined victim group might be governmental agencies
whose health care costs have allegedly increased because of such
commercial activities, or they might be self-appointed class-action
representatives. Were the plaintiffs to prevail, the damages awarded
might well be measured in the billions of dollars.
Aggregative torts have only recently arrived on the American tort
scene. Traditionally, tort law has focused on the rights of individual
victims claiming to have been harmed individually. But in recent years,
a minority of American courts have utilized a variety of aggregative tort
theories in attempting to justify massive judicial reallocations of
economic resources. This Idea briefly describes these developments and
argues that, to a profound degree, they exceed the legitimate bounds of
judicial authority and competence. Although a substantial majority of
American courts have rejected these aggregative approaches, so long as
even a small minority of judges in high places allow plaintiffs to exploit
these lawless claims, a plea for judicial restraint is warranted.
II.

THE RISE OF AGGREGATIVE TORT THEORIES OVER THE PAST
SEVERAL DECADES

Not all aggregative torts are of recent origin. Thus, a remarkable
exception to tort law's traditional emphasis on individual rights (and
wrongs) is the common law tort of public nuisance, long considered an
anomaly by legal commentators. 4 No doubt sensing the potential
lawlessness of the tort, courts traditionally constrained the public
nuisance concept by allowing actions to be brought only by public
representatives seeking to enjoin ongoing activities that unlawfully
(almost always criminally) interfere with the rights of the general

4. See, e.g., F. H. Newark, The Boundaries of Nuisance, 65 L.Q. REV. 480, 480 (1949)
(noting that public nuisance is a "mongrel" that is "intractable to definition").
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public. 5 Even within these constraints, public nuisance stands out as an
unusual common law example of an aggregative tort.
Arguably, the purest forms of recently devised aggregative torts are
brought by or on behalf of governmental units at the local, state, and
federal levels against commercial actors for having increased the costs of
administering various public welfare systems including, depending on
the nature of the defendants' allegedly antisocial activities, health care
payments, general law enforcement, and continuing efforts to maintain
beneficial social and economic climates in the relevant geographical
areas. 6 The governmental plaintiffs in these cases claim to be adversely
impacted by the commercial activities of allegedly harmful, anti-social
industries such as asbestos,7 tobacco,8 firearms, 9 and lead paint.' 0
Although the doctrinal bases of these actions include negligence, fraud,
unfair competition, public nuisance, and violations of state and federal
statutes, in essence they are rooted in equitable principles of unjust
enrichment." And although they are formally couched in terms of the
government recovering on its own behalf, they are clearly brought to
vindicate the rights of the public generally.12
The most spectacular governmental claims of this sort were brought
in the 1990s by the attorneys general of various states against members
of the tobacco industry, seeking reimbursement of tobacco-related health3
care expenditures under public welfare programs such as Medicaid.'

5. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. a (1979). Private plaintiffs
who seek recovery must suffer harm different in kind from that suffered by the public. Id.
§ 821C(l); Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance: MaintainingRational
Boundarieson a Rational Tort, 54 WASHBURN L.J. (forthcoming 2006).
6. See Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 115-16 (Conn. 2001) ("The plaintiffs

alleged that the existence of the nuisance [presented by defendant's gun distribution system] is a
proximate cause of injuries and damages suffered by [the city], namely, that the presence of illegal
guns in the city causes costs of enforcing the law, arming the police force, treating the victims of
handgun crimes, implementing social service programs, and improving the social and economic
climate [of the city].").
7. See, e.g., Detroit Bd. of Educ. v. Celotex Corp., 493 N.W.2d 513 (Mich. App. 1992).
8. See, e.g., Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
9. See, e.g., City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind. 2003).
10. See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. 002-0245 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Nov. 20,
2002).
11.

See generally Robert L. Rabin, The Tobacco Litigation: A Tentative Assessment, 51

DEPAUL L. REV. 331, 337 (2001) (characterizing states' reimbursement actions against the tobacco
industry, brought on several doctrinal grounds, as rooted in unjust enrichment) [hereinafter Rabin,
Tobacco Litigation].

12. Id. (noting that the state's legal theories asserted that the industry's conduct "constituted a
wrong against the public, as well as against individual smokers").
13. See generally id. at 337-42; see also Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 5 (manuscript at
15-19, on file with author).
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These tort actions were filed after facts were revealed beginning in 1994
that supported claims that the tobacco industry had knowingly misled the
public and governmental regulators regarding the levels and addictive
qualities of nicotine contained in tobacco products. 14 Although the
theoretical soundness of the unjust enrichment theory of recovery in
these cases was open to serious question, 15 the states and the tobacco
industry reached a Master Settlement Agreement in 1998, calling for
payment of $246 billion to the states and to the plaintiffs' law firms that
had brought and managed the claims on behalf of the states.16
Governmental plaintiffs have brought aggregative claims against the
manufacturers and distributors of other products. Thus, municipalities
have brought tort actions against the firearms industry, alleging that
major manufacturers have commercially distributed their products in
ways that have encouraged illegal secondary markets that supply
weapons for use in violent criminal activities. 17 The cities base their
claims on a variety of tort doctrines including, prominently, open-ended
versions of public nuisance. They seek reimbursement for the costs of
enforcing the law against violent criminals, treating the victims of
weapons-related crimes, and implementing a variety of social service
programs. While most courts have denied these claims as a matter of
law,' 8 a few have allowed them to proceed to trial. 19 Municipalities have
also brought public nuisance claims based on the health hazards posed
by lead-based paint, but so far without success. 20
The federal government has pursued aggregative tort theories in an
action against the tobacco industry to recover health care expenditures
that it has paid or will pay to treat tobacco-related illnesses. The United
14. See PETER PRINGLE, CORNERED: BIG TOBACCO AT THE BAR OF JUSTICE 138-59 (1998);
Robert L. Rabin, The Third Wave of Tobacco Tort Litigation, in REGULATING TOBACCO 176, 18385 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001).
15. See Rabin, Tobacco Litigation, supra note 11, at 337-39. (noting that plaintiffs' theories

"rested on a shaky foundation" and on "dubious theoretical premises").
16. See Susan Beck, The Lobbying Blitz Over Tobacco Fees: Lawyers Went All Out in Pursuit
of Their Cut of a HistoricSettlement and the Arbitrators Went Along, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 6, 2003, at

1.
17. See, e.g., City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1231-32 (Ind. 2003);
City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1141 (Ohio 2002). See generally
Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 5.
18. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 2002); Bd.
of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 2001); City of Chicago v.
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099 (Ill. 2004).
19. See, e.g., City of Gary, 801 N.E.2d 1222.
20. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 994 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1993). The

plaintiffs in these cases seek reimbursement for the costs of removing lead paint from public
buildings.
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States brought the action in 1999 under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 2 l seeking, inter alia, disgorgement
of $280 billion allegedly traceable to proceeds from cigarette sales
between 1971 and 2001 to smokers who became addicted before the age
of twenty-one.22 The government argues that the defendants engaged in a
fraudulent pattern of concealing the dangers and addictive qualities of
their products in connection with marketing efforts directed at minors. In
essence, the federal government's claim, in similar fashion to the claims
just described at the state and local levels, is based on unjust enrichment.
Using the broad language of RICO as a statutory springboard, the
government seeks to vindicate the public interest in response to conduct
it deems illegal under the Act. The federal district court, relying on an
earlier decision of the Second Circuit, denied the defendants' motion for
summary judgment on the RICO disgorgement claim and certified the
case for interlocutory appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit. 23 In a 2-1 decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the order

below and granted summary judgment for the defendants on the ground
that the disgorgement sought by the government is not available in a
civil proceeding under RICO, which limits relief to forward-looking
orders.24 Moreover, the majority reasoned that disgorgement would run
the risk of duplicating recoveries that are available to private parties,
while unfairly allowing the government to avoid a statute-of-limitations
defense applicable to private claims.2 5
If these actions by governmental plaintiffs represent pure forms of
aggregative tort claims, then class actions for economic losses by
nongovernmental plaintiffs may be thought of as hybrids. They are
hybrids because, while the class-action format on its face implies that the
aggregation is merely procedural and that the underlying claims are
substantively individual in nature, in reality the plaintiffs frame the
substantive claims aggregatively so as to exclude individualized factual
elements such as product defect and proximate causation that either the
claimants cannot prove or that might destroy the commonality required
for class certification. In truth, these class-action hybrids are public,
substantively aggregative claims dressed up rhetorically to resemble
private, individual claims that have been aggregated procedurally to

21. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2005).
22. See United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131 (D.D.C. 2000); see also
United States v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
23. See Philip Morris U.S.A., 396 F.3d at 1193.
24. See id.

25. Id. at 1201.
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achieve economies of scale. An example will reveal what is happening
in these cases. In the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, American tobacco companies
labeled some brands of cigarettes "light" and "lowered tar and nicotine."
The Federal Trade Commission established criteria for testing and
specifically approved the use of these labels on cigarettes passing the
tests. The cigarettes so labeled became enormously popular.26 In'light of
the evidence that came out in the mid-90s regarding the tobacco
industry's fraudulent concealment of the truth regarding the dangers and
addictiveness of their products, it appears to have occurred to plaintiffs'
lawyers that recovery might be obtained by persons smoking cigarettes
labeled "light" and "low tar."
However, if these claims were brought to recover for personal
injuries caused by smoking light cigarettes, the uniqueness of each
individual smoker's circumstances-whether a given class member
relied on defendants' misrepresentations or would have suffered the
same physical harm if the cigarettes had conformed to the labels-would
very probably have destroyed the factual commonality required for class
certification. Moreover, the claimants might not have been able to prove
the elements of reliance and causation. So the plaintiffs' lawyers came
up with an alternative approach: they brought statewide class actions,
based mostly on existing consumer protection statutes, seeking to
recover for the economic losses allegedly suffered by light-cigarette
smokers due to the cigarette companies' misleading marketing. 27 Simply
stated, these smokers argued that they had not received what they had
paid for-safer cigarettes-and that they should get all, or most, of their
money back. Substantively aggregating the claims on a class-wide basis
avoided the necessity of proving the elements of reliance and proximate
causation, which would have been difficult to establish on an individual
basis. Those elements could be assumed or more easily demonstrated
from a group-wide perspective. 28 Any doubts regarding the legitimacy of

26. See Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 2005 III. LEXIS 2071, No. 96236, at *3-41 (Ill. Dec. 15,

2005) (recounting the history of FTC regulation of the cigarette industry, including use of "lights"
and "lower tar and nicotine" labeling).
27. See, e.g., Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 2005 Ill.
LEXIS 2071 (111.
2005); Philip Morris
U.S.A., Inc. v. Hines, 883 So. 2d 292 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Aspinall v. Philip Morris, Inc., 813
N.E.2d 476 (Mass. 2004). See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-Sense
Constructionof Consumer ProtectionActs, 54 KAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).

28. In effect, plaintiffs' lawyers may approach these issues epidemiologically, showing that,
as a group, consumers demanded more "low tar" cigarettes in response to the labeling, cf supra
note 25 and accompanying text, and that, as a group, they spent more on those cigarettes than they
would have if the cigarettes had not been labeled in that manner. A majority of courts rejected
plaintiffs' attempts to collectivize the issues of reliance and causation in this manner. See, e.g.,
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drawing these collective inferences are arguably eliminated by the
consumer protection statutes themselves, which openly declare that they
are to be liberally construed so as to give consumers every benefit of the
doubt.2 9
Although several of the courts that have considered these lightcigarette class actions have refused to certify, 30 some have agreed to hear
the claims on their merits. 3' In one such case in Illinois, the trial judge
awarded an estimated 1.14 million members of the state-wide class
compensatory and punitive damages, attorney's fees, and prejudgment
interest totaling $10.1 billion.32 In December 2005, the Supreme Court
of Illinois in a 3-2 decision reversed the judgment below, ruling that,
because the FTC had authorized use of the "light" and "lower tar and
nicotine" labels, the action is barred by the terms of the Illinois
Consumer Fraud Act. 33 Although its reading of the Consumer Act moots

the other issues in the case, the majority opinion seriously questions
whether the record at trial supported class certification on the issues of
reliance, causation, and measurement of damages.34 Again, several trial
courts have refused to certify classes in these light-cigarette cases. But a
few other state courts have certified state-wide classes, and the final
outcomes in those jurisdictions remain in doubt.
Consumer protection statutes of the sort involved in the lightcigarette litigation have provided a basis for plaintiffs to seek class
certification of hybrid aggregative tort claims in other contexts.35
Besides the statutes, which exist in every state, the necessary ingredients
for bringing such actions are quite simple: large industries that might be
found to have exaggerated the benefits to consumers of their products
and activities, including playing down in their marketing the
concomitant risks to consumer health and welfare; and large victim
groups that might be found to have incurred economic losses from
Henry Schein, Inc. v. Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d 675, 693-94 (Tex. 2002) (denying certification for a
class of office management software purchasers).
29. See, for example, the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act involved in the Price decision: "'This
Act shall be liberally construed to effect the purposes thereof." 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/1 la
(2005).
30. See, e.g., Price, 2005 Ill. LEXIS 2071; Hines, 883 So. 2d 292; Curtis v. Philip Morris
Cos., No. PI 01-018042 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 16, 2004).
31. See, e.g., Aspinall, 813 N.E.2d 476; Craft v. Philip Morris Cos., No. 002-00406A, 2003
WL 23139381 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Dec. 31, 2003).
32. See Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 00-L-I 12, 2003 WL 22597608 (Ill.
Cir. Ct. Mar. 21,
2003).
33. See Price, 2005 I1l. LEXIS 2071.
34. Id.at*137-42.
35. See generally Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 27.
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purchasing and consuming products that were not as efficacious, or as
safe, as their marketing had led the public to believe. Upon reflection,
virtually every major industry in this country might be found to satisfy
these criteria. Wisely, the plaintiffs' bar has chosen to begin by going
after what might be called "politically incorrect" industries--defendants
upon whom, they hope, judges and juries will be comfortable shifting
the blame for major public health problems plaguing the country. Thus,
hybrid class actions aimed at recovering pure economic losses have been
brought against members of the alcoholic beverages industry, for
implicitly encouraging minors to drink; 36 members of the fast-food
industry, for encouraging eating habits that cause obesity and other
health problems; 37 and members of the pharmaceutical industry, for
over-promoting prescription drugs that may be harmful when used as
directed.38
It will be observed that in all of these hybrid class actions, the way
to convert traditional, uncertifiable personal injury claims into arguably
certifiable consumer fraud claims is somehow to translate traditional
elements of recovery for individual personal injuries into pure economic
losses that members of the victim groups may be presumed to share in
common. As indicated, consumer protection statutes appear to some
observers to provide the means for making these translations, 39 but they
are not the only means available to plaintiffs' lawyers. In the context of
asbestos litigation, for example, plaintiffs who have already developed
exposure-related cancers present the same individuality problems that
prevent class certification of tort claims in other contexts. But when
plaintiffs who have been exposed to asbestos fibers have not yet
manifested physical symptoms, they often bring class actions to recover

36. See, e.g., Complaint, Tomberlin v. Adolph Coors Co., No. 2005 CV 0545 (Wis. Cir. Ct.
Feb. 23, 2005); Complaint, Goodwin v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., No. BC310105 (Cal. Super. Ct., Feb.
3, 2004). See generally Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 27 (manuscript at 46-48, on file with
author).
37. See, e.g., Pelman ex rel. Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y.
2003), vacated in part andremanded, 396 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Schwartz & Silverman,
supra note 27 (manuscript at 38-41, on file with author).
38. See, e.g., West Virginia Rezulin v. Hutchinson, 585 S.E.2d 52 (W.Va. 2003); see also
Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 27 (manuscript at 48-49, on file with author).
39. Some of these statutes provide specified dollar amounts as minimum recoveries per
consumer, regardless of whether actual damages can be proven. These amounts range from $25 in
Massachusetts to $2,000 in Utah. See Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 27 (manuscript at 22 &
n. 113, on file with author).
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for their statistically increased risk of cancer,4 ° or for their emotional
upset, 41 or for the costs of medical monitoring aimed at detecting cancers
if and when they appear.42 Unlike traditional personal injury claims,
these claims take on the same fungible, aggregative qualities just
described in connection with class actions for pure economic losses
under consumer protection statutes. As in the consumer fraud contexts,
most courts have refused to recognize these anticipatory claims based
merely on exposure to asbestos.4 3 But some courts have allowed such
claims and have certified class actions based upon them, especially in
connection with claims for medical monitoring.44
III.

WHY AGGREGATIVE TORTS ARE LAWLESS TO THEIR CORE

Make no mistake about it, aggregative torts are inherently lawless
and unprincipled. Even if the defendants in these cases deserve to be on
some critics' lists of anti-social industries, what is happening in the
minority of American jurisdictions that have allowed these claims to
proceed is most definitely not in the long-range best interests of this
country. The end-objective of financially punishing "bad guys" does not
begin to justify the means by which that end is being pursued. All but
the most ardent anti-business advocates cannot help but wince, way
down inside, at the prospect of courts reallocating potentially billions of
dollars in the name of physically uninjured consumers, many of whom
continue to demand the very same products and services paternalistically
deemed by judges and juries to be against consumers' best interests. The
only interest group that would clearly benefit from the wide acceptance
of aggregative torts would be those plaintiff's lawyers who are
conceiving, funding, and bringing these actions on a contingency-fee
basis. Surely their clients, many of whom never receive anything from
the recoveries and most of whom end up paying higher prices for
consumer goods and services, are not benefiting in the same way as their
lawyers.
Aggregative torts are not lawless simply because they are
nontraditional, or court-made, or because they increase the liabilities of
40.

See generally James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Asbestos Litigation Gone

Mad: Exposure-Based Recovery for IncreasedRisk, Mental Distress, and Medical Monitoring, 53

SO. CAR.
41.
42.
43.

L. REV. 815, 822-23 (2002).
Id.at823-36.
Id. at 836-49.
Id.at828-31.

44. Id. at 838-41; see also Victor E. Schwartz et al., Medical Monitoring: The Right Way and
the Wrong Way, 70 MO. L. REV. 349 (2005).
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commercial enterprises. Liability law is evolving constantly, and courts
legitimately expand on existing bases of recovery from time to time.4 5
Nor are aggregative torts lawless merely because they suggest that tort
law has a public-law dimension, or that civil liability plays a regulatory
role in helping to make our society marginally safer. Deterrence theorists
and courts have long recognized these very real possibilities.46 Nor are
these new torts lawless merely because the monetary stakes are high.
When courts traditionally determine that the design of a popular model
of automobile is dangerously defective, the stakes for the manufacturer
in terms of future liability costs can be very high indeed.4 7
Instead, the lawlessness of aggregative torts inheres in the
remarkable degree to which they combine sweeping, social-engineering
perspectives with vague, open-ended legal standards for determining
liability and measuring damages. In effect, these new torts empower
judges and triers of fact to exercise discretionary regulatory power at the
macro-economic level of such a magnitude that even the most ambitious
administrative agencies could never hope to possess. In exercising these
extraordinary powers, courts arguably exceed the legitimate limits of
both their authority and their competence. Regarding the limits of
judicial authority, it is commonly understood that, in a representative
democracy, macro-economic
regulation is accomplished most
appropriately by elected officials and their lawful delegates.48 Of course,
traditional tort law unavoidably involves economic regulation to some
extent. But these new aggregative torts involve self-conscious judicial
regulation on such a breathtaking scale, abstracted from any
commitment to the individual rights of individual victims, that they
clearly exceed the political boundaries of judicial authority.4 9
The second way in which these aggregative torts clearly exceed the
boundaries of the judicial franchise concerns limits of the institutional

45. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) (adopting strict
products liability); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., I I1 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916) (eliminating privity
requirement in products liability actions based on negligence).
46. See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 35 (6th ed. 2003) ("For most
'instrumentalists,' the central social goal to be-furthered by tort law is to maximize total wealth in
society by deterring wasteful injuries and accidents.").
47. See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: PROBLEMS
AND PROCESS 159 (5th ed. 2004) ("[A] manufacturer can wake up one morning and find itself
confronted with the very real possibility that all the products it has sold for the last 20 years (all 450
billion of them) are legally defective.").
48. See Robert B. Reich, Don't Democracies Believe in Democracy?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12,
2000, at A22 ("[Excessive judicial lawmaking is] faux legislation, which sacrifices democracy.").
49. This analysis firmly rejects any "ends justify the means" arguments along the lines that "if
tort courts don't punish the bad guys, who will?"
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competence of courts to address open-ended problems of economic
planning and resource allocation. Like other processes of governmental
decisionmaking, adjudication assures that affected parties will be
allowed to participate in affecting outcomes. 5° Thus, litigants are
afforded the opportunity before a neutral arbiter to offer factual evidence
and to invoke legal norms so that each side may respectfully insist upon
a favorable decision as a matter of right. 5' For this to be possible, the
applicable legal rules governing a controversy must be specific enough
to arrange the constituent elements into linear chains of logic so that
each element may be considered more or less in isolation from the others
and resolved, even if sometimes only tentatively, before moving on to
the next. 52 Only when the rules of decision are sufficiently specific to
support these logical structures can each party take the judge or jury
through the elements of the case to the conclusion indicated by that
party's positions on the relevant facts and law.
In connection with these recently derived aggregative torts, the
applicable law is so vague as to make no attempt logically to separate
the relevant aspects for decision. Instead, vague standards leave it to the
discretion of triers of fact to "do what is right" in factual contexts that
juxtapose large numbers of putative victims against affluent groups of
commercial actors. Because most of the elements relevant to these
social-engineering decisions simultaneously relate to most of the other
elements, the litigants cannot work their way through linear chains of
logic and insist on outcomes as a matter of right. Instead, the parties
become supplicants, begging for enough of the tribunal's sympathy to
cause it to bless them with a favorable exercise of its unreviewably
boundless discretion. Thus, the lawlessness that inheres in aggregative
torts resides not simply in courts exceeding the bounds of their political
authority by functioning as politically unaccountable legislative bodies,
but also in courts exceeding the limits of their institutional competence
by effectively denying litigants a meaningful opportunity to have their
day in court.

50.

The legislature and the executive are accountable to the electorate, who participate in law-

making indirectly through the voting mechanism. Parties to contracts that create a form of private
legislation participate by bargaining.
51. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from
the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467, 469-77 (1976).

52. The law of contracts, for example, breaks down the issues in a contract dispute into
subcategories such as contract formation, interpretation, adequacy of performance, and measure of
recovery, with further subdivisions under each major heading. Traditionally, the law of torts breaks
disputes into issues of duty, breach, causation, harm, and plaintiff's fault, also with subdivisions.
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This notion of being denied one's day in court obviously applies to
the defendants in these aggregative tort actions, whose only hope is to
appeal to the instincts of juries regarding the unfairness of potentially
crushing liability for otherwise lawful conduct that might somehow be
found to be economically detrimental to segments of the American
public. Less obvious, but true nonetheless, is the fact that many of the
putative victims in these cases are also denied meaningful representation
of their interests by being lumped into amorphous classes of consumers
of particular products. Certainly, the consumers who have suffered
tangible personal injuries are disadvantaged when courts allow large
numbers of uninjured claimants to move ahead of them in the queue of
those seeking compensation via tort.53 The plaintiffs' lawyers are
rewarded when this distortion of priorities occurs because a successful
aggregative tort can generate billions of dollars in contingency fees that
are out of all proportion to levels of effort required. 4 Moreover, given
the ways in which these mass claims are structured in order to achieve
class certification and success on the merits, the remedies that courts
provide often confer no direct benefits 55-and sometimes impose real
detriments56-on the uninjured victims on whose behalf the actions
purport to have been brought.
That something quite unprincipled is occurring in the litigation
described in this Idea is further suggested by the fact that when courts
recognize these aggregative tort actions, allowing recovery for economic
losses and occasionally for emotional upset, they are acting contrary to
long-standing precedents that have denied such recoveries in the absence
of personal injury or property damage.57 To be sure, many of the claims

53. This has been especially true in the context of asbestos litigation, where allowing
thousands of uninjured claimants to recover jeopardizes the chances of badly injured claimants to
recover. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Asbestos Litigation Madness: Have the States Turned a
Corner?, 20 Mealey's Litig. Rep.: Asbestos 3-4 (Jan. 10, 2006).
54. The point is not that the plaintiffs' lawyers don't work hard-many of them do. It is that
they often are paid extravagantly well. See Robert A. Levy, Hired Guns Corral Contingent Fee
Bonanza, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 1, 1999, at 27. Plaintiffs' lawyers earned $105,022 an hour per lawyer
working on the states' aggregative claims against the tobacco industry. Id.
55. In connection with many of these aggregative torts, the plaintiffs' lawyers seek funding
for scientific research foundations and facilities to conduct medical monitoring and research. See
Broin v. Philip Morris Cos., 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994), reh 'g denied, 654 So. 2d 919
(Fla. 1995); John Heilprin, DuPontHit with $5 Billion Suit Over Teflon Risks, Assoc. Press, July 20,
2005. The lawyers are paid handsomely in cash but their clients often receive little or no direct
benefit.
56. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
57. Some of the Consumer Protection Acts allow recovery for emotional upset as "actual
damages." See, e.g., Laurents v. Louisiana Mobile Homes, Inc., 689 So. 2d 536, 542-43 (La. Ct.
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for pure economic losses sound in misrepresentation and fraud, for
which pure economic losses are traditionally recoverable. 58 But these
aggregative claims are fraud-based in name only; the traditional
elements of fraud have been strategically eliminated to support class
certification and provability. 59 Moreover, to the extent that the liability
imposed in these cases resembles strict enterprise liability aimed at
internalizing the social costs of undesirable commercial activities, many
of those liabilities are manifestly uninsurable by the commercial
enterprises on which they are imposed. Given the high degree of control
over the relevant risks exercised by the insureds-the victim classesmoral hazard and adverse selection would combine to destroy any hope
of achieving the social insurance objectives that enterprise liability
purports, in theory, to achieve.6 °
IV.

CONCLUSION

Accepting for the sake of discussion that these aggregative torts are
unprincipled and lawless in the ways described, what can one expect in
the future? For one thing, it is certain that more of these claims will be
forthcoming. For example, if the alcoholic beverage and fast-food
industries appear to be fair game to the plaintiffs' bar, then can the softdrink industry be far behind? 61 Consistent with the viewpoint reflected in
those cases, surely the Coca-Cola and Pepsi Cola companies, with all of
their success in marketing products loaded with caffeine and refined
sugar, must be misleading the American public into patterns of overconsumption that, in the aggregate, could be found by a jury of
disgruntled consumers to be detrimental not only to the physical health
of children, but also to the economic health of their parents. As indicated
earlier, most courts before whom claims of these sorts are being brought
can be expected to reject them. 62 However, given the potential for multibillion-dollar verdicts, even a relative handful of successful claims are
sufficient to embarrass the judiciary and damage the economy. Why do

App. 1997). For the traditional rules denying recovery, see generally HENDERSON ET AL., THE
TORTS PROCESS, supra note 46, at 293-314 (emotional upset), 338-53 (pure economic loss).
58. HENDERSON ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS, supra note 46, at 785-87.
59. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
60.

See generally James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 U.C.L.A. L.

REv. 377 (2002).
61. Aaron D. Twerski, Dean of the Hofstra University School of Law, told the author in
December 2005, that he had heard a rumor to this effect. In fact, he was accurate. See Walter K.
Olson, Taking Cola to Court, CITY J., Winter 2006, at 9.
62. See supra notes 3, 19, 25, 31 & 37, and accompanying text.
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even a few judges take these trumped-up, lawless claims seriously? And
what can be done about it?
Regarding the question of "why?," at the trial level the answer must
lie, in part, in the reality that among the many thousands of competent
trial judges in this country, a small minority simply lack the maturity and
good sense to tell the difference between tort claims that seek redress for
real injuries to the physical well-being of individual victims, on the one
hand, and pseudo-tort claims cobbled together by aggregating the
interests of large groups of so-called victims, on the other. Genuine tort
claims primarily seek to benefit the victims of wrongdoing; aggregative
tort claims seek primarily to benefit the political ambitions of public
prosecutors and the financial ambitions of private lawyers. And some
trial judges apparently are unable to tell the difference. More disturbing
is the possibility that some judges, who realize well enough what is
happening, have political agendas that allow them self-consciously to
exceed the obvious limits of their institutional authority and competence
in order to serve those agendas. Of course, all judges are unavoidably
influenced to some extent by their politics. 63 But some judges may allow

their personal agendas to dominate excessively.
What, if anything, can be done to minimize the chances that a few
appellate courts, notwithstanding these serious threats to judicial
integrity, will recognize aggregative torts as legitimate extensions of
liability law? Confusion and misunderstanding can be reduced by
educational efforts by the parties directly affected, amicus groups, and
legal commentators. 64 Regarding the possibility of self-conscious
judicial activism by some judges who envision themselves participating
in a tort-based, pro-consumer movement, one can hope that those judges
will come to appreciate that aggregative tort claims are designed to
benefit the claimants' lawyers more than consumers and that they
threaten judicial integrity to a profound degree. And when reason runs
out, one's last hope is that judges will realize how embarrassing their
approvals of these claims will prove to be, both to them individually and
to their courts, in the longer run. Peer pressure may operate in this
context,65 especially when combined with the possibility, in state
63. See generally HENDERSON ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS, supra note 46, at 154 & n.15,
and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., Henderson & Twerski, supra note 40; Lauren E. Handler & Charles E. Erway
III, Tort of Public Nuisance in Public Entity Litigation: Return to the Jungle?, 69 DEF. COUNS. J.
484 (2002); Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, State Farm v. Avery: State Court Regulation
Through Litigation Has Gone Too Far, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1215 (200 1).
65. See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 23-24
(1960); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 534 (4th ed. 1992).
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jurisdictions in which members of the high courts are elected to office,
of being turned out at the next election.66 When judges act like
politicians, they deserve the politician's fate.

66. See Henderson, supra note 53, at 16 & nn.209-14.
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